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Negative Theology As Jewish Modernity

Indiana University Press

The Limits of Negative Theology in Medieval Kabbalah and Jewish Philosophy

SANDRA VALABREGUE

"Nothing!" would be the ineluctable answer to the question: "what can be said of God?" For whatever God is — it is beyond the scope of human knowledge. Indeed, such a statement is very common not only in medieval Jewish philosophy but in medieval Kabbalah as well. However beyond that shared consensus, hide different conceptions of negative theology; this and more, alternative conceptions present at times a real challenge to the very definition of negative theology. To better understand what kind of negation is at stake in a given theological system, one needs to understand what kind of limits, as well as what is off-limits, the work of negative theology comes to set. What is the meaning of that "nothing" will indeed broadly depend on the role given to the delimitation of knowledge.

This essay offers a general overview of the different role played by negative theology in medieval Jewish philosophy and Kabbalah, in light of their different degree of commitment to negative theology. It is my intention to downplay the hegemonic tendency of negative theology and propose instead new ways to think about the interaction between negative and positive theologies. To my view, negative theology as a system that considers negation as the only possible approach is, as a matter of fact, marginal not only in Kabbalah but in Jewish philosophy as well. The main problem we encounter when attempting to assess the role of negative theology comes from its own paradoxical thinking and its hegemonic nature which, at face value, seems to leave no place for an alternative. It is nevertheless very rare to see negative theology eradicate all positive theology, for most of the time, it opens up or gives place to alternative theology. Whereas the role of what I propose to call "comprehensive negative theology" is better known, that of restrictive negative theology has not yet been properly assessed. However, even in the case of Maimonides, the main advocate of comprehensive negative theology, the extent of his negative theology is still an open question and scholarship offers a wide range of interpretations.

The role of negative theology in medieval Kabbalah is even the more problematic for, contrary to the comprehensive Maimonidean theology, it develops a restrictive use of negative theology. In Jewish philosophy and even the more so in Jewish mysticism, the rational/theological inquiry is usually challenged by the performative and contemplative relation to God opening up to nonspeculative approaches. In Jewish mysticism, Gershom Scholem's understanding of the Kabbalistic theological structure is articulated on an ontological distinction between revealed God and concealed God. The problem raised by such a distinction is that it presupposes a theological system articulated on negative theology before we even get a chance to study the role of negative theology in a given system. Moshe Idel has pointed out the importance of thinking about theological conceptions in their diversity. This is not merely a call for pluralism, but also a revision of what is understood as the abstract and ineffable God. In the same vein but in a different perspective, in his pioneering article, Elliot Wolfson has also greatly unsettled our understanding of Kabbalah by challenging its negative theology in light of its positive assertions.

In what follows I wish to push further that inquiry into the role of negative theology in medieval thought and describe in large strokes the limits themselves of negative theology. To that purpose I will address the question by inverting the formula of Elliot Wolfson and discussing positive theologies in light of negative assertions. This change of perspective will help us to understand aspects of negative theology and its relation to positive theology in a more fundamental way beyond their apparent contradictions. To that task it is crucial to distinguish between theological systems dedicated to negative theology and theological system where negative theology has a place but not necessarily a dominant one. To better understand the role of negative theology, I therefore propose to distinguish restrictive uses of negative theology from comprehensive negative theology. Restrictive because it cohabits with alternative positive conceptions that are not coming from within the work of negation. After a general overview of negative theology in philosophy and in Jewish philosophy, I will present the place of negative theology in medieval Kabbalah. The nature of the corpora discussed dictates that Jewish philosophy will be presented chronologically, whereas the Kabbalistic material will be organized thematically. While philosophical texts and authors present an organized corpus, this is not the case with Kabbalistic literature which is a much more fragmented and eclectic corpus.

In Jewish traditions, expression of negative theology goes back to Philo of Alexandria in the first century. Philo discusses the conception of God's unknowability on the basis of Exodus 33:20 and its twofold Glory conception. However, the remote status of God does not disqualify every relation, since for Philo nonknowledge is the acknowledgment of human nothingness and as such presents a gateway to an encounter with God: "for then is the time for the creature to encounter the creator when it has recognized its own nothingness." This mixture of total inaccessibility and the possibility of access nevertheless through negation is the very mark of the comprehensive approach of negative theology

At face value, however, Philo's negative theology became the legacy of the Christian church and the extent of his influence on Jewish thought has not yet been properly evaluated. Following a renewed interest in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian philosophies, the unknowability of God will become a motto among the medieval philosophical traditions both Muslim and Jewish. The Middle Ages, with the renewal of philosophy in Islam and consecutively in Judaism, sees the question of the divine attributes at the center of the debate. In the Islamic tradition, Al Kindi, Al Farabi, Avicenna, Al-Gazali, and Averroes will all exacerbate the unknowability of God. The exaltation of the ignorance has also been at the heart of medieval texts such as in the Theology of Aristotle and those of Muslims thinkers.

In the spirit of their time, Jewish philosophers adhere as well to the idea of unknowability. Following the philosophy of Kalam, David ibn Merwan al-Mukammas, Saadia Gaon, and Joseph ibn Zaddik reject the semantic validity of divine attributes; nevertheless, they would accept predication only if it truly reflects God's essence. A common use of negation aims to establish what He is not. For Al-Mukammas, for example, when we affirm that God is alive, we are in fact denying that He is dead. However, this approach should be seen as a partial negative theological approach, for Al-Mukammas nevertheless follows the view of the Mu'tazilites, whom accept terms that are equivalent to God's essence. This view stands in contrast to the more comprehensive and exclusive negative theology of the Book of Causes, in which nothing not even an attribute of essence can be predicated: "This is because description only comes to be by means of discourse, and discourse by means of intelligence, and intelligence by means of reasoning, and reasoning by means of imagination, and imagination by means of sense. However; the First Cause is above all things, since it is their cause; as a result then, it comes to be that it does not itself fall under sense or imagination or reasoning or intelligence or discourse; consequently, it is not describable."

For Saadya Gaon, rational knowledge and prophecy are equivalent, prophecy being superior only in virtue of its divine origin. Even though the epistemological dimension of the limit of knowledge is an important aspect of Saadya's philosophy, the central point is still the divine unity in conformity with the philosophy of Kalam. In the controversy of his time between those who believe in attributes and those denying them, Saadya opt for a position that put forth the inner divine unity Promoting the simplicity of God's unity is meant to resolve the problem of attributes by refraining to resort to predication. Even though God cannot be known, the specific aspects of the divine unity are reflected in a formulation that offers some solution to important semantic problems. For example, the notion of divine simplicity excludes any differentiation in God and consequently gives an account of God's essence but not by means of real attributes, modes, or attributes of essence. How can something partial be said about God without implying multiplicity in the Divine? For the problem of human-limited semantics lies in its equivalent partial approach to God. Simple, undifferentiated unity is the best testimony of His wholeness, since by denying multiplicity and attribution it affirms indivisible unity.

Accordingly to his Neoplatonic heritage, Bachya ibn Paquda will also profess the unknowability of God. In the Duties of the Heart, the existence, unity and eternity of God as essential attributes are opposed to attributes of action, distinguishing therefore attributes of God before and after the creation: "For He is exceedingly close to you in His activities, but infinitely remote in any representation of His essence or comparison with it. As already stated, we will never find Him in this way" Through acknowledgment of God in the world, that is, of His actions, one can nevertheless experience God. Negative assertions have therefore a limited action, even if they are part of a process of purification of the soul and reason, worshiping God can only come from another way. Apparently, God's revelation in His actions is a sufficient source of knowledge where the creature meets His creator, knows Him intimately and worships Him: "With the knowledge of God that is in their hearts; they serve Him as if they were with the holy angels in the highest heavens."

Shlomo ibn Gabirol, another central Neoplatonic philosopher, argues that "direct knowledge of the primary Existent is impossible why ... because it is above and beyond all things and is illimitable." Such a view can be tracked back to Isaac Israeli and his disciple Dunash ibn Tamim. For Gabirol, God is pure essence, and we only perceive his essence through a composite of form and matter such as it is reflected in God's actions. Along with a notion of God's essence as being above of everything, Gabirol promotes a view that will influence Kabbalah notably through its nachleben with Moshe ibn Ezra's Arugat ha-Bosem. In Fons Vitae, the Master declares that "because the knowledge of any knower requires him to encompass what is known the illimitable cannot be encompassed by knowledge."

Even though apophatic approaches can be traced back very early in the Middle Ages, only with Maimonides can one find a comprehensive system of negative theology According to his view, predication on God's essence is strictly impossible, and the only knowledge possible is that of His actions. Maimonides's negative theology rejects the ontological approach of his predecessors who while adhering to negative theology would have nevertheless allowed some kind of positive predication. Following the inner logic of negative theology negative assertions are more valuable than any positive assertions; therefore, the more we predicate of something the more we know: "in a similar way you come nearer to the apprehension of Him, may He be exalted, with every increase in the negations regarding Him." By negating what is not true, one comes closer to the truth while emptying predication of any content, for what is beyond physics cannot be known with certainty. In this perspective, the greatest achievement of philosophy is in the understanding of God as principle of causality — by contemplating on the world and on the manner in which natural causality reflects God's perfection. At crucial points of his metaphysical doctrine, Maimonides opts for ambiguous if not contradicted positions. The place of negative theology in Maimonides's philosophy is no exception and has been the subject of numerous discussions. On the one end of the spectrum, Maimonides's negative theology leads to the so-called skeptic approach. Shlomo Pines offers to read Maimonides in light of Al Farabi with whom he agrees that the union with the active intellect is impossible for there is no resemblance between man and God even on this level. Following that lead, the result of the critic of theology is a comprehensive negative theology — not only is knowledge above the physical world impossible but, in contrast with other negative theologies that give place through negation to a mystical path, it is completely restrictive to personal fulfillment in that world. The skeptical approach lately received a new expression in a book by Micah Goodman, interpreting Maimonides in a modern relativistic perspective.

On the other end of the spectrum, as represented by two main schools of interpretation, we find the possibility nevertheless of some experience of what is beyond negation. Recently, Menachem Lorberbaum has offered to read Maimonides's philosophy not as a critique of theology but rather as a critical theology, which cumulates in a state of illumination. Following this reading, Maimonides's critique of language should be understood as a way to empty language from any content in order to make place for the experience of what is beyond the limits of language. This understanding of the role of negative theology in Maimonides's philosophy is to be counted alongside the skeptical one, both presenting a comprehensive negative theology. Major differences are nevertheless to be noted, for whereas the "skeptic" offers a limitative and exclusive position, the other one is extensive since it seeks to experience what is above language. This reading is made possible by considering the poetic dimension of language. Following a number of conditions, the human intellect has access to divine knowledge, even if the price is silence. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Sufi tradition has been precisely the path taken by Maimonides's son and grandson. An interesting example of this path of negative theology can be found in the words of the famous Andalusian Sufi and philosopher Ibn al-Arabi who promotes silence as an alternative to ignorance: "There are some of us who profess ignorance as part of their knowledge maintaining that: 'to realize that one cannot know (God) is to know.' There are others from among us, however, who know, but who do not say such things, their knowledge instilling in them silence rather than [professions] of ignorance. This is the highest knowledge of God, possessed only by the Seal of Saints." Of special interest here is the critique of the profession of ignorance as ultimate knowledge. The text introduces an important difference between ignorance as the highest degree of knowledge and the highest degree of knowledge that can only be acknowledged through silence. The comparison between the two gives us a good insight on different negative theological schools and eventually on the crucial difference between the two main streams of comprehensive negative theology: those of the "skeptic" and the "mystic." According to the skeptical approach, the rational inquiry stops at the acknowledgment of its ignorance — since ignorance is the only insight possible, it is the highest level of knowledge. The mystical approach passes the limits of knowledge toward an apophatic experience, where the limits of knowledge are apprehended within a silent acknowledgment. The silence in this case is not ignorance; it is all together an acknowledgment of the limits and a state of indescribable knowledge.

Whereas the "poetic" reading of Maimonides's philosophy and the Sufi approach open to the apophatic experience, the third way to interpret Maimonides's theory of knowledge should be understood as a restrictive negative theology. If one is to understand in Maimonides's philosophy the union with the active intellect as possible, then the negative theology plays only a role of limitation. Even though this way opens to noetic experience beyond regular knowledge, it does not belong to the comprehensive negative theology because it is not the result of the apophatic process. Following this school, if the conception of union is possible, this is only because it presumes the resemblance between God and Man. In fact, the possibility of union in its Averroistic tone has been the prevalent interpretation of Maimonides, shared by his translator and interpreter Shmuel ibn Tibbon, and medieval Kabbalah as well. It is important to mention yet another aspect of Maimonides's philosophy that allows some positive theology and demands there fore to reassess the role played by negative theology in his metaphysic. This is his conception of the Tetragrammaton — the only name that resists Maimonides's critique of divine predication. According to him, among all the names given to God, this is the only one that should be understood as a proper name, as His personal name. As such, just as the name of someone does not predicate anything about him but is simply attached to him, the Name of God is the only name that contains, even undisclosed, something of God's essence, and therefore is a positive representative of God.

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Excerpted from Negative Theology As Jewish Modernity by Michael Fagenblat. Copyright © 2017 Indiana University Press. Excerpted by permission of Indiana University Press.
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